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THE ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE
James A. Krauskopf*
I. Introduction
In considering the reform of the nation's welfare system, issues
of implementation and program management are too often ig-
nored. Congressional and state legislative debates focus on policy
concerns-such as the level of benefits, determination of need (in-
come and assets), eligibility criteria, work requirements, incentives
and disincentives (e.g., school attendance, support for additional
children, and teen parenting). These and related issues form the
critical elements in the ongoing national welfare debate, especially
in the current climate in which Congressional and state leaders
have proposed major policy shifts and benefit reductions in what
have been the sustaining entitlement aid programs for the poor.
Particularly in periods such as the present, when policies are chang-
ing, the role of administration becomes critical in determining what
happens to recipient well-being, program costs and fulfillment of
objectives.
The nation is currently in the midst of what promises to be one
of the sharpest changes of direction in social welfare policy since
the 1930s, when the basic shape of American public assistance pro-
grams was established.' Much of this attention focuses on wel-
fare-the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children
.(AFDC) program and various state/local general assistance pro-
grams.2 The combination of federal legislation based on the Re-
* James A. Krauskopf is the Dean of the Graduate School of Management and
Urban Policy at the New School for Social Research in New York and the Former
Commissioner of the Human Resources Administration of the City of New York.
Dean Krauskopf holds an M.P.A. from Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs (1965) and a B.A. magna cum laude from
Harvard College (1963).
1. Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 627 (1935). See Joel F. Handler, The Transforma-
tion of Aid to Families With Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Histori-
cal Context, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457 (1988).
2. Social Security Act, tit. 4 § 401, 49 Stat. 627 (1935) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (1988 & Supp. 1993)). See Randi Mandelbaum, Trying to Fit Square
Pegs Into Round Holes: The Need For a New Funding Scheme for Kinship Caregivers,
22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907 (1995).
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publican Congressional "Contract With America"3 and a variety of
state enactments and proposals is moving the welfare system in the
direction of reduced benefits and penalties to recipients for pur-
ported negative behavior.
Among the changes recently proposed in federal legislation or
promulgated by states through administrative "waivers" of federal
law are: (i) "Family Caps" to deny assistance for additional chil-
dren born to welfare recipients, (ii) making teenagers who bear
children out of wedlock ineligible for aid, (iii) reducing payments
when children consistently miss school, and (iv) placing limits on
the duration of welfare benefits to a family.4 These and related
provisions, together with benefit reductions enacted by some states
and the prospect of converting the federal AFDC entitlement pro-
gram into block grants to the states with a specified appropriation
level,5 mark a dramatic change in national social welfare policy.
The damaging potential of these changes to families dependent on
public assistance is heightened by the lack of attention paid to
planning for the administration and implementation of these new
provisions.
As new welfare reform legislation is enacted, it will be important
to consider its administrative implications. Administration of wel-
fare is a state or local responsibility.6 Interactions with families re-
ceiving assistance are the responsibility of regional or
neighborhood welfare offices where line staff is more likely to have
clerical and administrative training than social work backgrounds.
In some states, administration occurs at a district office of the state
social services department. In others, it is a county social services
branch. In a few, like New York City, it is a center managed by an
agency of city government.7 How the overall welfare system is
managed-in particular, what happens in the local administrative
offices where contact occurs with welfare recipients and the tone of
the program is set-has not been a major point of discussion dur-
ing the current Congressional process. Yet, the experience of past
3. HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, LEGISLATIVE
DIGEST (Sept. 27, 1994).
4. See MICHAEL WISEMAN, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY & ROBERT
M. LAFOLLETTE INSTITUTION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE NEW STATE WELFARE INI-
TIATIVES, 13-18, 30-33 (1993).
5. Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
6. See, e.g., 18 N.Y. CODE R. & REGS. part 300, N.Y. SOCIAL SERV. L. § 20(5)
(McKinney 1988).
7. In New York City, the Human Resources Administration administers welfare
and oversees the provision of social services for the City of New York. 18 N.Y. CODE
R. REGS. part 300, N.Y. SOCIAL SERV. L. § 20 (5) (McKinney 1988).
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welfare reforms suggests the critical need to be concerned with is-
sues of management and implementation.
This Essay discusses the problems of implementation and admin-
istration of proposed welfare reforms. Part II gives a brief histori-
cal background on welfare reforms. Part III describes the nature
of administering welfare programs. Part IV sets forth the current
welfare reforms in place. Part V notes the public perception of
welfare reform measures. Part VI compares the welfare system
against other governmental expenditures to provide perspective on
the size of the welfare system. Part VII examines the probable
consequences of the federal government turning the administration
of welfare over to the states in the form of block grants, and Part
VIII concludes by recommending that social services be integrated
at the local level.
II. Brief Background on Welfare Reform
Until the 1980s, proposals for welfare reform-including those
of Presidents as different as Richard Nixon8 and Jimmy Carter9-
called for a strong federal role in assisting those below the poverty
line. The resources and redistributive capacity of the federal gov-
ernment were considered crucial to the operation of an adequate
and fair welfare system.10
By contrast, early in his administration, Ronald Reagan pro-
posed a "swap and turnback" in which the federal government
would take over the Medicaid program to provide healthcare for
the poor, whereas the states would be responsible for AFDC and
many other federal categorical grant programs." Although Presi-
dent Reagan's proposals, like those of Nixon and Carter, were not
enacted, current welfare reform proposals increasingly emphasize
state, rather than federal responsibility for welfare.
The last major change in federal welfare policy actually enacted
was the Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA or the "Act"), which
emphasizes work and self-sufficiency as key objectives through its
8. President Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan. JAMES LEIBY, A His-
TORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 326-27
(1978).
9. President Carter proposed the Program for Better Jobs and Income. JOEL F.
HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY 160-
61 (1991).
10. Hugh Heclo, Poverty Politics in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR
CHANGE 396, 410-12 (Sheldon H. Danzinger et al. eds., 1994).
11. SAR A. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR 19-21 (5th ed. 1985).
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JOBS (Job Opportunities and Basic Skills) provisions.12 Under the
FSA the federal government would assist the states by providing
matching funds to expand education and training, while requiring
increased participation in work activities by AFDC recipients.
1 3
The Act developed out of an important, but short-lived, consensus
among different ideological groups that the welfare system should
more strongly focus on work and employment activities. 4
In a field hungry for quick impacts, the Act has not, to date,
produced dramatic change in the welfare system. The failure to
produce results may be attributed to both the limited implementa-
tion of work requirements (workfare) and the underfunding of job
training and education provisions by both federal and state govern-
ments. 15 For example, only about eleven percent of AFDC recipi-
ents are participating in FSA work programs. 16
Most welfare job programs have had relatively low levels of ac-
tive participation and only small impacts on reducing caseloads, re-
gardless of the underlying ideology or particular program design
that produced them. The welfare rolls are highly dynamic, with
most recipients leaving within a few years.17 The challenge for em-
ployment programs has been to motivate and assist the longer-term
recipients, those not likely to get jobs of their own accord, to enter
into work-related activities and jobs. The evidence indicates that
programs do not achieve success quickly or easily with these long-
term welfare recipients.'"
The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation conducted
studies about the Riverside County, California employment pro-
gram begun in 1985 that emphasized aggressive job search tech-
12. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-485, 100th Congress, 2d Sess. (Oct.
13, 1988).
13. Id.
14. Handler, supra note 1, at 479-83; Larry C. Backer, Of Handouts and Worthless
Promises: Understanding the Conceptual Limitations of American Systems of Poor
Relief, 34 B.C. L. REV. 997 (1993).
15. Paul Offner, Workfail: Waiting for Welfare Reform, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 28,
1992, at 13.
16. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE TO WORK: CUR-
RENT AFDC PROGRAM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FOCUSED ON EMPLOYMENT 6 (Dec.
1994).
17. Peter Gottschalk et al., The Dynamics and Intergenerational Transmission of
Poverty and Welfare Participation, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR
CHANGE, supra note 10, at 93-99.
18. JAMES RICCIO, DANIEL FRIENDLANDER ET AL., MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION
RESEARCH CORP., GAIN: BENEFITS, COSTS, AND THREE-YEAR IMPACTS OF A WEL-
FARE-TO-WORK PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13 (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter MAN-
POWER REPORT].
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niques.19 The studies showed more substantial results with
program participants securing greater earnings from work and us-
ing less welfare than a comparable control group of recipients who
did not participate in the job search program.20 Program partici-
pants were, however, only five percent more likely than the mem-
bers of the control group to leave welfare altogether.2' Recent
welfare employment research has carefully distinguished various
outcomes-including client participation in program services, se-
curing jobs, reduction of welfare utilization, achievement of self-
sufficiency by leaving welfare altogether, and raising family income
above the poverty level.22 These different objectives have related,
but distinctly varying, results. For example, many of those who get
jobs do not leave the welfare rolls; many who do leave welfare do
not rise above the poverty level because their jobs do not pay
enough. 3 People leaving AFDC may also lose Medicaid and child
care assistance, creating now-familiar disincentives for recipients to
leave welfare altogether.
For reasons to be discussed below, redirecting the management
of public assistance to emphasize work and self-sufficiency at the
local office level is a difficult, long-term process. To date, both fed-
eral and state policy-makers have not supported the sustained ef-
fort necessary to build participation in work programs-regardless
of whether the program was a conservative workfare design or a
liberal program emphasizing education and training.
Ill. The Nature of Welfare Administration
For the past twenty years, since "separation" of income assist-
ance from social services, welfare has been managed primarily as
an office-based system. The emphasis is on achieving accuracy in
both eligibility determinations and benefit payments. The United
States Department of Health and Social Services measures each
state for payment errors that are based on periodic "quality con-
trol" audits and then subjects the states to fiscal sanctions for ex-
ceeding tolerance limits.2 4 If payment error rates exceed low
19. Id. at 4-5.
20. Id. at 7-10.
21. Id. at 15, 35.
22. Id. at 30-35.
23. Id. at 35; The official national poverty level was $12,320 for a family of three in
1994. Habitat for Humanity Builds Hope, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 24, 1995, at
F12.
24. See generally, John Wrafter, QC: Abbreviation for Failure, PUBLIC WELFARE,
Fall 1984, at 14-21 (discussing affect of the "quality control" process).
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tolerance levels established by the federal government, the Depart-
ment levies, or threatens to levy, fiscal sanctions on the states.25
The states, in turn, audit and can sanction their local sub-jurisdic-
tions-thus producing a sharply hierarchical accountability struc-
ture, which emphasizes procedures for eligibility and payment
accuracy.26 Because payments to welfare recipients are substantial,
attention is focused, on ensuring that the line workers in local of-
fices get the eligibility documentation and paperwork correct. Se-
nior social services and budget officials in most jurisdictions have
established elaborate procedures to minimize overpayment and in-
eligibility and guide their systems accordingly. 7
In short, the system has generally emphasized administrative
rather than service objectives. Since public expenditures for wel-
fare at current levels are controversial, there is strong justification
for close attention to fiscal integrity in the administration of the
program. The public deserves assurance that funds are going to
those truly eligible and in the right amounts.
The strong emphasis on the complex details of making accurate
eligibility determinations, however, leaves little time in most busy
urban welfare offices for assisting clients in achieving self-suffi-
ciency and reduced dependence on welfare. Provision of social
services and assistance to recipients beyond cash and Food Stamps
have been de-emphasized. They are offered by caseworkers sepa-
rately from provision of public assistance. Most provisions of so-
cial services in New York City, for example, are by nonprofit
community-based social services organizations, while the determi-
nation of entitlement eligibility is made by local government
workers.28
In discussions of welfare reform, the interconnections that need
to be established between welfare assistance and other support
services necessary for families to cope with problems and move to-
ward self-sufficiency have not been well examined. Such manage-
ment and coordination issues are most' salient at the point of
administration of welfare benefits, but line welfare workers must
administer rules and regulations that are not only complex and
sometimes conflicting, but also are subject to frequent changes and
25. Id. at 15.
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. L. § 74-i (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994).
27. See generally MARY Jo BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES:
FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM (1994).
28. Two examples of such social services programs are daycare and foster care.
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reinterpretations. 29 Paper-work is excessive, time available for
training is taken up with learning new procedures, and computer
support is generally short of what is required.
The pressures on uriban welfare offices are large and growing. In
New York City, for example, welfare Caseloads have always been
large and recently have been increasing, while the size of the staff is
shrinking.30 In December 1994, there were 1,157,684 public assist-
ance recipients in the City-up by 45,000 from a year earlier and
by more than 330,000 from five years ago.31 Inevitably, this situa-
tion requires worker-client interactions to be highly focused on
documentation of income, assets, and the related aspects of eligibil-
ity for assistance. General problem-solving and provision of serv-
ices to welfare recipients are difficult in such settings. The time
and motivation for welfare workers to address other problems of
families and to identify the resources they need to move toward
self-sufficient lives is very limited. 32
Because of the growth of caseloads and the concentration on eli-
gibility determination, welfare administration does not connect
easily to other services that public assistance families may require,
or to broad strategies for neighborhood and community develop-
ment. Welfare eligibility workers tend to operate in isolation from
other service providers, given the pressures of caseloads, quality
control, and the maze of complicated and oft-changing regulations,
forms and requirements they must administer. Close observers
have characterized this system as "an administrative culture that is
more concerned with enforcement of eligibility rules and with mak-
ing sure that recipients comply with AFDC regulations than with
helping clients toward self-sufficiency. '33
Introducing additional objectives, particularly those involving in-
teraction with other services (e.g., childcare, employment training),
requires time and management commitment. As indicated, the
objectives of the last substantial national welfare reform legisla-
tion, the Family Support Act of 1988-to increase the participation
of welfare recipients in employment-related activities and to pro-
29. Allen Kraus & Jolie B. Pillsbury, Streamlining Intake and Eligibility Systems,
PUBLIC WELFARE, Summer 1994, at 21.
30. HRA FACrS, SWATI DESAI, DIRECOR OF DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH
(1995).
31. Id
32. See BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 27.
33. Id.
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duce outcomes that increase earned income and reduce depen-
dency-have been only partially realized to date.34
IV. Current Welfare Reform
Although the Act is still in a relatively early stage of implemen-
tation, and reliable results of research are just now becoming avail-
able, it has never received full attention in the states. The Act has
been eclipsed in recent years by a series of state-initiated waiver
requests to the Department of Health and Human Services to
make other kinds of changes in AFDC. 35 In noting that the FSA
"was billed as the most comprehensive welfare reform bill since the
passage of the Social Security Act in the 1930's," Mary Jo Bane and
David Ellwood, who were then about to assume senior positions in
the Clinton Administration, wrote in 1993 that "welfare reform
was once again on the agenda of the President and of most gover-
nors, as though the FSA had already become an irrelevance or a
failure. 36
Many of the recent state waiver proposals introduced "welfare
reforms" in the form of new penalties and program reductions that
were not related to the employment focus of the FSA.37 These
waivers of the uniform provisions of the Social Security Act allow
states to experiment with new requirements not contained in the
basic law. California, New Jersey, Wisconsin and other states have
used waivers to limit benefits for what is considered inappropriate
behavior, such as excessive absence from school or birth of addi-
tional children.38 In two Wisconsin counties, an approved waiver
authorizes the termination of benefits altogether for the next three
years after a family has received AFDC for two years.39 The Gov-
ernor of Wisconsin wants to apply this system statewide, and the
Wisconsin Legislature has voted to end completely the AFDC pro-
gram by the end of the century.4 °
34. Irene Lurie, JOBS Implementation: Building Capacity and Encouraging Per-
formance, paper prepared for the Annual Research Conference of the Association for
Public Policy Analysis and Management, Chicago (Oct. 27-29, 1994) (on file with the
Fordham Urban Law Journal).
35. See WISEMAN, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
36. BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 27, at 1.
37. Mark Greenberg, Welfare By Waiver: Fixing Welfare Waiver Policy, PUBLIC
WELFARE, at 11-12 (Winter 1995); Michael Wiseman, Welfare By Waiver: Fixing Wel-
fare Waiver Policy, PUBLIC WELFARE, Winter 1995, at 11-12.
38. Greenberg, supra note 37.
39. Id. at 13-14.
40. Id.; Mike Flaherty, Welfare Cap at Top of Agenda, WISCONSIN STATE JOUR-
NAL, Dec. 7, 1994, at 3B.
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Recently, the provisions of these and other related state waivers
have dominated discussions of what is developing as the next
round of national welfare reform. Public and Congressional atten-
tion has shifted from the JOBS program under the FSA to appar-
ent enthusiasm for the variety of negative incentives that are
included in the House of Representatives' welfare reform bill,
many of which are patterned on particular state waivers. 4' The
careful findings from welfare employment research in a variety of
states have not been used to guide debate or program redirection.
Instead, political discourse has been dominated by more strident
calls for drastic changes and reductions in AFDC scope and costs.
At the local level, these new directions will certainly shift priorities
once again and are likely to redirect attention of administrators
away from an employment focus in operating the program at the
local level.
V. The Public's Perception of Welfare Reform
There continues to be great and unresolved national ambiva-
lence about welfare. Polls indicate that the public has been willing
to aid children and other needy people, but does not want to assist
those who have additional children while on welfare, are able-bod-
ied and do not appear to make a sufficient effort to work, or those
who become parents as teenagers.42 Distinguishing and separating
these groups for receipt of benefits is difficult in practice. Elected
representatives, in designing many of the current proposals, appear
ready to forego protecting children in order to enact disincentives
and penalties for disfavored parental behavior.43
Welfare reformers have struggled in the national policy thicket
for much of the past thirty years. Although distinctly conservative
legislation may be prevailing in the current Congress and in many
states, no true national consensus has yet been achieved by propos-
als to reduce benefits and enact penalties. Opposition from chil-
41. H.R. 1214 includes time limits for cash AFDC assistance, eliminates aid to
children born out of wedlock to mothers under age 18, freezes cash aid through the
year 2000, restricts eligibility of disabled children for Supplemental Security Income
benefits, and converts AFDC, child protection, child care and nutrition programs
from federal entitlements into block grants with state discretion replacing federal pro-
gram requirements.
42. See, e.g., GEOFFREY GARIN, Guy MOLYNEUX ET AL., PETER D. HART RE-
SEARCH ASSOCIATES PUBLIC ATrITUDES TOWARD WELFARE REFORM: A SUMMARY
OF KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS, AMERICAN VIEWPOINT (1993); RICHARD J. BEHN &
DOUGLAS Muzzio, THE EMPIRE FOUNDATION AND THE LEHRMAN INSTITUTE, NEW
YORKERS ON THE LIMITS OF WELFARE, EMPIRE STATE SURVEY (1994).
43. Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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dren's rights advocates and other groups, as well as from important
members of the research and academic communities, remains
strong.44 Undoubtedly, the national policy debate about welfare
will continue and further changes will be forthcoming in the fu-
ture-perhaps to swing the balance back from some of the more
punitive directions being pursued in 1995.
VI. Putting Welfare in Perspective
Although discussions of welfare focus on the AFDC program
and, in some states, on general assistance (e.g., Home Relief in
New York), AFDC constitutes only about one percent of federal
expenditures, and general assistance is not a major share of the
budgets of most states.45 Medicaid costs, including those for wel-
fare recipients, do, however, constitute major and increasing costs
for states, as well as for the federal government, but these costs
include large Medicaid payments for the elderly, disabled and
other non-public assistance recipients. 6
Social Security, Medicare and other programs for the elderly, by
contrast, are far larger than welfare for children and their families.
In 1993, of families receiving federal, state and local government
assistance, twenty-four percent (about twenty-five million families)
received means-tested aid, such as AFDC, Medicaid, Food Stamps,
school lunch, housing and others.47 By contrast, thirty-eight per-
cent (more than forty million families) received Social Security,
Medicare, unemployment, veterans' and other non-means-tested
government benefits.4 8
The focus of public attention on welfare, particularly on AFDC,
also ignores other family and children's programs-such as Food
Stamps and nutrition assistance; Medicaid and health; child wel-
fare, child care, and other social services; job training and educa-
tion; and housing assistance-that are important to the well-being
of families. Although many of these programs are now subjected
44. These include the Center for Law & Social Policy, Children's Defense Fund,
and the Child Welfare League of America.
45. VEE BURKE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, AFDC REFORM: WHY AGAIN?, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS CRS-3 (Jan. 4,
1995).
46. Barbara L. Wolfe, Reform of Health Care for the Nonelderly Poor, in, CON-
FRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 10, at 260, 266.
47. DAWN NUSCHLER & GENE FALK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, RECIPIENCY OF FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT BENE-
FITS AMONG FAMILIES IN 1993, at 3, 4 (Dec. 21, 1994).
48. Id.
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to sharp budget reductions,49 little attention is paid to how they are
related to welfare and to how they affect many of the same families
who receive AFDC.
While national public assistance policy has historically been es-
tablished by Congressional legislation and by regulations issued
from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), it is
likely that the states, which already have discretion in setting bene-
fit levels and eligibility provisions, will now receive increased au-
thority to shape public assistance programs as they see fit.
Whether by Congressional enactment of a block grant to replace
the AFDC entitlement program or through Clinton Administration
policy that instructs HHS to be more lenient in granting waivers to
states, it is clear that substantial new state discretion to restructure
programs and establish tailored provisions of public assistance will
result from the current round of welfare reform. How these new
state-inspired provisions will affect local administrative offices is
less clear.
VII. The Impact of Block Grants
When the changes proposed in 1995 are implemented, state and
local social service administrative agencies will be responsible for
managing them. The promise of enhanced flexibility for the states
in designing welfare programs appears to present opportunities to
redirect management priorities toward self-sufficiency, client assist-
ance or other state and local objectives. This result, however, is far
from certain. If the entitlement status of AFDC-by which any-
one meeting the income, asset and other eligibility requirements
can receive benefits-is ended, as proposed in the House block
grant proposal, states may be given authority without the resources
to fulfill entitlement needs.
A similar phenomenon on a lesser scale occurred in the early
1980s after the Reagan Administration enacted block grants for so-
cial services and other programs along with cuts in their appropria-
tions.50 Local administrative discretion amounted to selecting
which programs to close. Having the flexibility to restructure in
the face of inadequate resources can be a hollow power, especially
49. Dawn Decwikiel-Kan, "Essential" Services Could Be Lost Under New Budget;
Department of Social Services, NEWS & RECORD, Mar. 30, 1995, at BI; Karen Pennar,
Are Block Grants The Answer?, Bus. WK., Apr. 3, 1995, at 89.
50. SARA. LEVITAN & CLIFFORD M. JOHNSON, BEYOND THE SAFETY NET: RE-
VIVING THE PROMISE OF OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA 152-54 (1984).
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if it involves coping with the consequences of citizens having insuf-
ficient resources to retain their housing and care for their children.
While block grants could enable states to simplify the welfare
system at the local administrative level, many states have contrib-
uted as much to the narrow, hierarchical and categorical character
of welfare administration as has the federal government. The sepa-
ration of welfare administration from child welfare, employment
and other programs relevant to welfare recipients has been abetted
by state accountability rules. The same vertical accountability
structure by program category that is initiated at the federal level
prevails and is often reinforced in state social services systems.5 1
What can make the system change?
7
VIII. Recommendations for Welfare Reform
A more promising direction for welfare reform is to build up-
ward from neighborhood service networks. Connecting public
assistance recipients to the other services and institutions in their
neighborhoods and communities can reduce their isolation and as-
sist many with employment. The objective of welfare reform
should be to change the vertical hierarchy that now characterizes
the administration of welfare into a more horizontal approach that
encourages interconnections among clients and service providers at
the neighborhood level. 2
AFDC is one of many programs affecting recipients and poten-
tially enabling them to move toward self-sufficiency. Many other
services-including childcare, health, job training and education-
are necessary to achieve this objective. 3 Relevant services are
provided by nonprofit, community-based organizations, as well as
by other governmental agencies. 4 Enabling all of these services to
51. In the AFDC, child welfare & medicaid programs, states generally regulate
local administration of these programs in the same separate, categorical manner as
they are enacted at the federal level.
52. For discussion of services integration efforts, see ANN ROSEWATER,
GRANTMAKERS FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES: A PHILANTHROPIC PERSPECTIVE (1992); JOAN WYNN,
JOAN COSTELLO ET AL., THE CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN AT THE UNIVER-
SITY OF CHICAGO, CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES: A NEW APPROACH TO
SOCIAL SERVICES (1994); and James A. Krauskopf, Overcoming Obstacles to Imple-
menting Reform of Family and Children's Services, (paper delivered at the 16th An-
nual Conference of the Association for Public Policy and Management (1994)) (on file
with the author).
53. See generally Margo D. Butts, Urban Welfare Reform: A Community Based
Perspective, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897 (1995).
54. In New York, for example, the Department of Employment, Community De-
velopment Agency, Department of Youth Services and the Department of Mental
894
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operate effectively in networks at the neighborhood level would
make it more realistic for welfare clients to develop plans to move
toward self-sufficiency.
If welfare rules can be simplified and stabilized, the function of
local welfare offices and their workers can be broadened to include
provision of access to such services. Training and support could
focus more on available resources for recipients and less on details
of new eligibility requirements, as often occurs now. Policy-makers
must support such procedural simplification in order to reduce the
fiscal and administrative costs of providing public assistance.
Ideas for making the complicated administration of public assist-
ance benefits more manageable have been developed and imple-
mented in a number of locations. What has not occurred is to
make streamlined administration the rule, rather than the excep-
tion, in the way public assistance is administered. Rather than em-
phasizing specialization by program category, as the present system
does, the functions of line workers in welfare and other social ser-
vice offices should become broader and more generic. Workers
should see their responsibilities as meeting overall client needs and
moving them toward self-sufficiency, rather than narrow program-
specific requirements.5 6
An additional component of reform is to eschew the contending
ideologies that have pitted different approaches to employment for
welfare recipients against one another. None of these approaches
has been sufficiently sustained to achieve 'large impacts on welfare
caseloads. Both workfare (requiring recipients to work in govern-
ment functions for their public assistance checks) as well as educa-
tion and training opportunities should be expanded. Too few
recipients are involved in either right now. If work requirements
are coupled with counseling that is directed toward job placement
at the end of the work experience, they can be an effective mecha-
nism to help recipients eventually to achieve self-sufficiency.
Whether the job search precedes or follows training is less im-
portant than ensuring that more recipients are introduced to work
and related services. Sustained, stable administration of employ-
ment programs with adequate provision for child care and other
support services is not a panacea. Yet, providing these basic sup-
ports, and then incrementally increasing resources to enable partic-
Health are among city agencies that contract with community-based organizations to
administer assistance for low income families and children.
55. See, e.g., Kraus & Pillsbury, supra note 29.
56. See generally ROSEWATER, supra note 52.
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ipation to grow, can be much more effective than the past practice
of lurching from one program design to another every few years.
Coupled with an ongoing commitment to research and an evalua-
tion to guide policy and administration, this approach is more
likely to produce a reorientation of welfare towards work than
more punitive measures, such as time-limited benefits for
recipients.
All of the foregoing, of course, are within the context of current
urban labor markets. Recognition of the problems on the supply
side of the economy is important as well. There should be strategic
use of public service jobs and nonprofit service jobs as bridges for
public assistance recipients from welfare to unsubsidized employ-
ment. Budget limitations will restrict the number of public service
jobs, but they should be seen-along with workfare and education
and training-as part of the range of transitional steps between
welfare and work.
One final note relates to the role local governments play as in-
heritors of the effects of welfare reforms. Cities are the place of
last resort; city governments are the resources of last resort. Un-
like the state and federal governments, cities cannot avoid the con-
sequences of changes in social policy. If the currently proposed
reductions in welfare benefits and availability are to diminish the
ability of welfare recipients to retain their housing and care for
their children, these welfare recipients will become the responsibil-
ity of local government in one form or another. Whether through
shelter of the homeless or provision of foster care, it is not possible
for urban public officials to ignore what happens to their
constituents.
The greatest damage to those who depend on government sup-
port comes at times of major transition in programs such as public
assistance. If this is such a time, cities will face these consequences
first.
